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ARE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
THINGS OF THE PAST? THE INCREASING ROLE
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE*
ROBERT

F WILLIAMS**

Increasing use of the constitutional commission as an auxiliary
device for initiating both major and minor changes is one of the most
significant developments in the procedure of modernizing state
constitutions. Constitutional commissions were developed initially, and
have been used primarily, as auxiliary staff arms of state legislative
assemblies. Their principal function has been to provide expert advice
on constitutional problems and issues and to propose and draft
amendments, revisions, and even entire constitutions. The 1968 Florida
Constitution was the first state organic law to accord constitutional
status to the commission as a formal method of proposing constitutional
change.
Albert L. Sturm'

Interestingly, the research leading to this article grew out of work

* This is an expanded version of The Role of the Constitutional Commission in State
Constitutional Change, published as CHAPTER 6 in THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A
BRIEFING BOOK (Temporary State Commission on Constitutional Revision, Gerald Benjamin, ed.,
1994) and is reprinted here with permission. I would like to thank the Commission Research
Director Gerald Benjamin, and Commission Counsel Professor Eric Lane, for the opportunity to
participate in the Commission's work, and to thank Gerald Benjamin for his helpful comments on
the draft chapter, as well as this expanded version. I would also like to thank Janice C. May, John
Kincaid, and Alan Tar for their helpful comments and ideas.
** Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. Author of
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d Ed. 1993). I would like to thank Lee
D. Sinins, Class of 1996, for invaluable research assistance.
1. Albert L. Sturm, The Procedure of State Constitutional Change - With Special Emphasis
on the South and Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 569, 585 (1977).
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performed for a state constitutional commission.
Such appointed
commissions and their growing impact on the evolution of state
constitutions have not been adequately recognized. 2 Compared to the
constitutional convention, that unique, two hundred year-old invention of
American political practice, the constitutional commission is of relatively
recent vintage. It is only about a century old. In fact, in his 1887
Treatise on ConstitutionalConventions, Judge John Alexander Jameson
described the constitutional commission as "a novel device."3
Constitutional commissions are "extratextual," not generally being
provided for in state constitutions. Such commissions also are not
usually mentioned in the standard list of mechanisms for state constitutional change: elected constitutional convention proposals, amendments
and revisions proposed by legislatures, and initiatives proposing state
constitutional amendments.4
In modem political practice, each of the mechanisms for state

2. But see Walter H. Nunn, The Commission Route to ConstitutionalReform: The Arkansas
Experience, 22 ARK. L. REV. 317 (1968) (in-depth analysis of Arkansas Commission); WILLIAM H.
STEWART, THE ALABAMA CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (1975); Walter E. Sandelius, The Kansas
Experience: State ConstitutionalRevision and the Moral Element, 40 NEB. L. REV. 575 (1961);
Alfred T. Goodwin, The Commissionfor ConstitutionalRevision, 67 OR. L. REV. 1 (1988) (Oregon);
Hans A. Linde, On Reconstituting "Republican Government, " 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 193, 19697 (1994) (same); The Commission for Constitutional Revision, A New Constitutionfor Oregon:
A Report to the Governor and the 52nd Legislative Assembly (1962), 67 OR. L. REV. 127 (1988);
John L. Sanders, North Carolina, in COMPACTS OF ANTIQUITY 143, 146 (Richard H. Leach, ed.
1969); Thomas G. Pullen, Jr., Why the ProposedMarylandConstitution Was Not Approved, 10 WM.
& MARY L. REV.378, 378-392 (1968) (Maryland Commission); JOHN P. WHEELER AND MELISSA
KINSEY, MAGNIFICENT FAILURE: THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967-68 20612, 229-39 (1970) (same). James Lowell Underwood's two-volume work on the South Carolina
Constitution contains recurring references to the Constitutional Revision Committee of the late
1960s. THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, VOLUME 1: THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE
LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES (1986) and THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, VOLUME II:THE JOURNEY TOWARD LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT(1989). See also notes
35, and 72-92 infra, and accompanying text.
3. JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR
HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 570 (4th Ed. 1887, 1972 Da Capo Reprint).
Jameson expressed the opinion that the use of constitutional commissions to facilitate constitutional
revision as opposed to amendment was of doubtful constitutionality. Id. at 573.
Roger S. Hoar's CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR NATURE, POWERS AND
LIMITATIONS (1917) did not consider the role of constitutional commissions, but interestingly it was
written originally for the Massachusetts Constitutional Commission that provided background
information for the 1917 Constitutional Convention.
4. See, e.g., Michael G. Colantuono, The Revision of American State Constitutions:
Legislative Power, PopularSovereignty, and ConstitutionalChange, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 147778 (1987). Colantuono acknowledges the constitutional commission in a footnote. Id. at 1478 n.26.
See also Michael Colantuono, Pathfinder: Methods ofState ConstitutionalRevision, 7 LEGAL REF.
SERV. Q. 45 (No. 2, 1987).
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constitutional change, except in Delaware,5 involves the electorate in an
exercise of popular sovereignty. The use of a constitutional convention
usually relies on three expressions of popular will: deciding the question
whether there should be a convention, electing the delegates, and voting
on whether to ratify the convention's recommendations. With legislatively-proposed amendments, the direct expressions of popular will are cut
to one: voting on whether to ratify the legislature's proposed amendments. In the initiative process for state constitutional amendments, the
voters are involved initially not as the electorate, but as petition signers;
they vote later on whether to ratify the proposals gaining enough valid
signatures to be placed on the ballot. In Florida, with its new Constitutional Revision Commission, the voters are only involved at the final
stage of voting on whether to ratify the Commission's proposals.
Constitutional commissions can and often do play ancillary roles
crucial to each of these recognized mechanisms. It may be that the
constitutional
constitutional commission has now overtaken the
facilitating
state
constitutional
convention as the most important source
6
change.
The need for established processes of change in state constitutions
was recognized early, particularly by Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson
contended that:
And, lastly, let us provide in our constitution for its revision at
stated periods... Each generation is as independent as the one
preceding, as that was of all which had gone before. It has then, like
them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes
most promotive of its own happiness; consequently, to accommodate
to the circumstances in which it itself, had received from its predecessors; and it is for the peace and good of mankind, that a solemn
opportunity of doing this every nineteen or twenty years, should be

5. Delaware is the only state that provides for legislative amendment to the state constitution
without a vote of the people. See Opinion of the Justices, 264 A.2d 342 (Del. 1970).
6. This may be a premature conclusion. Almost forty years ago John Bebout observed:
A few years ago many people were saying that the
constitutional convention was a thing of the past. There was a
fifteen year period between adjournment of the Missouri Constitutional Convention of 1922-23 and the meetings of the New York
and New Hampshire conventions in 1938 when no state held such
an assembly. The last twenty years, however, have seen a distinct
revival of the constitutional convention.
John Bebout, Recent Constitution Writing, 35 TEx. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (1957). In any event,
constitutional conventions are not now commonly used in the states. See Gais and Benjamin, infra
note 52.
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provided by the constitution; so that it may be handed on, with periodic
repairs, from generation to generation, to the end of time, if anything
human can so long endure.7
Evolution of the processes of state constitutional change, particularly the
requirement of popular ratification, continued well into the nineteenth
century.' The evolution is still taking place.
A number of states (now numbering fourteen), like New York, have
acted on Jefferson's view and amended their state constitutions to require
a periodic consideration of state constitutional change.' Those states,
and all the others, also rely on the other methods of change listed above.
The commission method has now emerged as the leading mechanism for
stimulating state constitutional change. Any careful study of the
processes of state constitutional change cannot, therefore, ignore the role
of constitutional commissions.
Since Jameson wrote, at least four distinct permutations of the
constitutional commission have evolved, with very different functions
and effects. Commissions have been used: 1) in conjunction with
constitutional conventions, either to help implement their work after a
failure at the polls, or through background study and analysis to lay the
groundwork for such conventions; 2) as devices for assisting legislatures
in avoiding conventions, and thus retaining control of constitutional
change; 3) to work together with the legislative branch in studying and
recommending state constitutional change; and finally, 4) they have
begun, in Florida, to develop as a method for generating and directly
recommending constitutional amendments to the people, bypassing both
the legislature and the convention.
State constitutional commissions can be created and funded in a

7. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816) in THOMAS JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS 1395, 1402 (Library of America ed., 1984). Jefferson's letter is quoted in Albert L.
Sturm, infra note 15, at 66 n.24. For a complete analysis of Jefferson's attitudes toward
constitutional change, see JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT 59-78 (1992). See also Merrill D. Peterson, Mr. Jefferson 's "Sovereignty of the Living
Generation," 52 VA. Q. REv. 437 (1976). On the need for amending constitutions, see RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford
Levinson, ed., 1995).
8. Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary
Observationson State Constitution-Makingin the Nineteenth Century West, 25 RUTGERS L. J. 945,
985-89 (1994).
9. See Robert J. Martineau, The Mandatory Referendum on Calling a State Constitutional
Convention: Enforcing the People's Right to Reform Their Government, 31 OHIO ST. L. J. 421
(1970); Janice C. May, State Constitutions and ConstitutionalRevision, 1990-91, 29 THE BOOK OF
THE STATES 2, 4 (1992).
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variety of ways, and be directed to report to different officials.10
Creation by statute requires assent of both the legislative and the
executive, and usually assures legislative funding. Creation by legislative
resolution accomplishes the task by involving only a single branch. In
both of these instances, the report is usually to be submitted to the
legislature. Constitutional commissions should be distinguished from
joint legislative study committees and task forces, which are internal to
the legislative branch."
Constitutional commissions can also be created by the governor
either by executive order or by less formal means, and required to report
to her. Because this method does not involve the legislature, funding can
not necessarily be assumed. In Mississippi, the governor appointed a
constitutional commission, whose report was to be submitted to him,
without issuing an executive order, apparently to provide for a less
formal body.12 In Oklahoma, private funds were raised to support a
governor's constitutional commission when the legislature refused to fund
3
it.'
Because of the indirect route taken by constitutional changes
proposed by commissions, debates and reports of such commissions
arguably do not qualify as "constitutional history" in the direct sense that
the debates in a constitutional convention, or in the legislature on
proposed amendments, would be considered evidence of the "intent of
the framers." Technically, and legally, of course, the appointed members
of a constitutional commission are not the "framers" of ratified amendments that are based on their recommendations. They are not "representatives."' 4 But this is too narrow a view of constitutional history. The
commission members operate under a direct delegation of power from
either the legislature or the governor. Their recommendations form the
origins of important state constitutional changes. Of course, neither the
legislature nor a constitutional convention is bound to accept the
commission's recommendations, nor even to limit their consideration
only to those recommendations forwarded by the commission. The

10. See STuRM, infra note 78.
11. Rich, infra note 35, at 88; Dodd, infra note 72 at 263. Such direct legislative bodies are
a very important source of recommended state constitutional changes.
12. Southwick, et. al., infra note 35, at 27-28.
13. See infra note 40; May, infra note 80, at 23.
14. Robert S. Friedman and Sybil L. Stokes, The Role of Constitution - Maker as
Representative,9 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 148 (1965), reprintedin JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, infra note
47, at 76; Harvey v. Ridgeway, 450 S.W.2d 281,288 (Ark. 1970) (Legislator may serve as constitutional convention delegate.)
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legislature or convention is neither limited by, nor to, such recommendations. Still, courts routinely rely on the materials prepared by state

constitutional commissions. 5
So, this form of commission-generated constitutional history, even
if not technically of a quality to be considered evidence of "intent of the

framers," or without questions about its accuracy or completeness, is still
of great importance to scholars, students, judges, government officials,

lawyers, historians and political scientists. It is an important part of state
constitutional history. 6 Many of the reports and recommendations of

state constitutional commissions are relatively readily available on
microfiche, 7 or in many libraries.
I.

PREPARING FOR A CONVENTION OR ADVISING THE LEGISLATURE:
NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY

The appointed constitutional commission is not specified in any state
constitution except for that of Florida. Its unique Constitution Revision
Commission can submit its proposals directly to the voters and is

discussed in detail below. Utah has utilized an ongoing, statutory
constitutional revision commission which makes recommendations to the
legislature, also discussed below.' 9
The idea to use a constitutional commission seems to have
originated in earnest in New York, with the 1872 Constitutional
Commission, recommended by the governor and appointed by the
legislature. ° New Jersey had utilized, albeit unsuccessfully, small,
15. See, e.g. Snow v. City of Memphis, 527 S.W.2d 55, 61 (Tenn. 1975), appeal dismissed
423 U.S. 1083 (1976); State v. Manley, 441 So.2d 864, 885 (Ala. 1983) (Beatty, J., dissenting);
Claudio V. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1297 (Del. 1991). The Florida Supreme Court relied on the
records of the 1966 Constitutional Revision Commission, located in "a special file in the Supreme
Court Library." Hayek v. Lee County, 231 So.2d 214, 216 (Fla. 1970).
16. See G. Alan Tar, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 841, 852 (1991) ("[t]he more recent the constitutional provision, the more likely that
there is an extensive documentary record - pre-convention studies... bearing on its meaning.").
17. State constitutional history materials, including many constitutional commission reports,
are catalogued in CYNTHIA BROWNE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, FROM INDEPENDENCE
TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENT UNION, 1776-1959: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1973) (the materials
are contained in a microfiche collection accompanying the bibliography); SUsAN RICE YARGER,
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 1959-1975: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1976); BONNIE CANNING,
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, REVISIONS AND AMENDMENTS, 1959-1976: A BIBLIOORAPHY (1977).

18. See notes 56-65, infra, and accompanying text. See also Robert F. Williams, A Generation
of Change in Florida State Constitutional Law, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 133, 137-39 (1992).
19. See notes 53-55, infra, and accompanying text.
20. JAMEsON, supra note 3, at 570.
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limited state constitutional commissions to study the judicial and
executive articles of the constitution in 1852 and 1854.21 Peter Galie,
a leading authority on the history and development of the New York
constitution, describes the 1872 Commission as " ... an innovation in
the state's constitutional history, which seemed to fill a gap between a
cumbersome convention and the ad hoc legislative amending process.
This method allowed distinguished and informed individuals to recommend constitutional change to the legislature and then to the people."'
The 1872 Constitutional Commission in New York was able to
revive and recommend some of the ideas (such as a longer gubernatorial
term and the item veto) from the proposed constitution that failed at the
polls in 1867. After the Commission's
proposals were approved by the
23
them.
ratified
people
the
legislature,
In 1873, New Jersey seemingly emulated the New York commission
idea. The legislature there, after refusing to pass legislation calling for
a constitutional convention to revise the outmoded 1844 constitution,
provided for the establishment of a constitutional commission on terms
very similar to New York's 1872 statute.2 4 This was surely one of the
most successful constitutional commissions in history: the New Jersey
legislature (after extensive and lengthy debate of its own) submitted
twenty-eight of the amendments recommended by the commission, all of
which were approved by the voters in 1875.5
There is much more of importance about the 1873 Constitutional
Commission, though, than just the twenty-eight amendments that were
ultimately adopted by the voters. First, there was extensive debate about
state constitutional changes that did not lead to final recommendations

21. Wheeler, infra note 79, at 57; Connors, infra note 30, at 10; Rich, infra note 35, at 18
(Rich reports that the commissions each consisted of three persons).
22. PETER J. GALiE, THE NEw YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 16 (199 1).
23. Id. at 15. See also Lewis B. Kaden, The People: No! Some Observations on the 1967
New York Constitutional Convention, 5 HARv. J. LEOIS. 343, 364 (1968). Michigan reflected a
similar pattern: after the defeat of the 1867 Michigan Constitutional Convention's proposals, a
constitutional commission was created in 1873. JAMESON, supra note 3, at 570. Jameson reported
that the Michigan Commission, consisting of eighteen members, met for seven weeks, and
"recommended a large number of amendments, which upon submission to the people, were all
rejected." Id. at 571-72.
24.

ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 9-11

(1990).
25. Id. Interestingly, a number of scholars have missed this important commission. See, e.g.,
JAMESON, supra note 3, at 570; White, infra note 35, at 1148.
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to the Legislature.2 6 There were amendments debated by the Commission and recommended to the Legislature which were submitted to the
voters only after legislative modifications. 7 Finally, not all of the
amendments recommended by the Commission were ultimately submitted
by the Legislature to the voters in 1875.28
Even looking just at the twenty-eight amendments which survived
the triple hurdles of final Commission proposal, legislative acceptance
and recommendation, and ratification by the voters, the impact of the
1873 Commission's work has indeed been great. As John Bebout noted
over fifty years ago, the "1875 amendments necessarily entailed a
tremendous increase in judicial review of legislation. Since 1875 over
half of the more than 300 legislative acts invalidated by the courts were
nullified because of the 1875 amendments. 29
The mechanism of an appointed commission to study and recommend to the legislature changes in the state constitution was, as in New
York, not authorized in the New Jersey Constitution. In this sense, these
commissions were "extra-constitutional."
Still, the 1873 Constitutional Commission, unlike earlier and later
New Jersey constitutional commissions, was not a "limited" commission.3" It was authorized, and in fact did, explore, debate, and entertain
proposed amendments to the entire state constitution. The period of
1873-75, which includes not only the Commission's deliberations, but
also the Legislatures's lengthy consideration of its recommendations and
the referendum on the Legislature's twenty-eight proposed amendments
in 1875, "stands behind only three others in significance for state
constitutional development in New Jersey: 1776, 1844, and 1947."',
New Jersey's experience with commissions at the turn of the century
proved much less effective. The reports of the 1894 and 1905 commissions were sent to the legislature and went no further. As Charles
Erdman observed, on these occasions the legislature "lacked the courtesy
of acting on the report by so much as 'referring it to committee' for
appropriate burial. In short, the appointment of a constitutional

26. John Bebout, Introduction, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1844 ev (1942).
27. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 10.
28. Id.; BENNETT M. RICH, THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF NEW JERSEY 19
(1957).
29. Bebout, Introduction,supra note 26, at cvi.
30.

RICHARD J. CONNORS, THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN NEW JERSEY:

1940-1947 9-13 (1970). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
31. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 10.
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commission can be viewed as a legislative side-step to avoid rather than
to facilitate constitutional revision."32
Later, in the 1940s, the use of a legislatively-created constitutional
commission (again as an alternative to a constitutional convention) laid
the groundwork, politically and substantively, for the New Jersey
Constitution of 1947. After the people rejected a combined commissionjoint legislative committee revised constitution at the polls in 1944, a
concensus developed leading to the highly successful 1947 Constitutional
Convention.33
The constitutional commissions came into being in New York and
New Jersey based on the justifications of efficiency and expertise, neither
of which were regarded, according to Galie's analysis, as attributes of the
constitutional convention ("cumbersome") or the legislative amendment
process ("ad hoc"). The commission, under these circumstances, served
as a research and study group (expertise) and as a technique for agendasetting in the legislature (efficiency).
But despite these similarities in the New York and New Jersey
experience, there seem to have been additional motivations in the use of
the commission method in the second case. In New York, the constitutional commission followed a constitutional convention. In New Jersey,
by contrast, the commission was a substitute for a convention. Legislation introduced in the same session called for a convention, and gained
substantial support. The commission method appears to have been used
to diffuse popular pressure. on the legislature to call a constitutional
convention, and as a response to fears about the outcome of a convention. The commission mechanism, therefore, retained control for the
legislature over the final recommendations to the voters.34 As noted,
most commentators on constitutional commissions have emphasized only
the efficiency and expertise rationales. 35 But in New Jersey neither was

32. CHARLES R. ERDMAN, JR., THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION -

A BARRIER TO

GOVERniENTAL EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY 16 (1934).

33. John P. Keith, Recent Constitutional Conventions in the Older States, in W. BROOKE
GRAVES, infra note 35, at 38, 44-45; RICHARD J. CONNORS, supra note 30, at 30-61; ROBERT F.
WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 13-14.
34. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 9.
35. See JAMESON, supra note 3, at 574-75; Note, State Constitutional Conventions: Limitations
on Their Powers, 55 IOWA L. REV. 244, 259 (1969); Leslie H. Southwick and C. Victor Welsh, III,
Methods of Constitutional Revision: Which Way Mississippi? 56 MISS. L.J. 17,26-28 (1986); Dale
A. Kimball, Note, The Constitutional Convention, Its Nature and Powers - The Amending Procedure, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 390, 392-94 (1966); Thomas Raebum White, Amendment and Revision
of State Constitutions, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1132, 1147-49 (1952); James E. Larson, Constitutional
Revision, VIII U. SOUTH CAR. GOVERNMENTAL REV. 1, 3 (May, 1966); Page Keeton, Methods of

HOFSTRA LAW& POLICY SYMPOSIUM

[Vol. 1:1

central. Rather the commission was a means for legislative control of
the process of state constitutional change, in the face of rising popular
and gubernatorial pressure for such change. The technique of retaining
legislative control through the use of the commission method for
constitutional revision was later noted by such scholars as Albert
Sturm36 and James Henretta. Henretta recently made the following
criticisms:
In many other states, such as Georgia in the 1940's and Kentucky and
California in the 1960's, legislatures dispensed completely with a
constitutional convention. To meet the pressing need for the reform of
outmoded constitutional structures, the legislatures appointed commissions to consider revisions and to report their recommendations.
These commissions were not democratic bodies responsible to the
people. Their proposals came before the voters only after being
carefully reviewed and revised by legislators, governors, and other state
officials.
Whatever the gloss ... the commission revision process ...represented a diminution of activist popular sovereignty. In
a carefully calculated fashion, these maneuvers removed power from
the hands of the citizenry. The result was a constitution revised as
much through administrative procedures
as through constitutional
37
debate and political compromise.
These kinds of criticisms, however, focus on a certain type of
constitutional commission - the one that is created to make recommendations to the legislature. As W. Brooke Graves noted, constitutional commissions have come to be widely "used for a variety of reasons,
and in many different ways. 3 8 New York's experience bears out this
observation, as will be discussed presently. Graves went on to describe

ConstitutionalRevision in Texas, 35 TEX. L. REV. 901,904 (1957); George D. Busbee, An Overview
of the New Georgia Constitution, 35 MERCER L. REV. 1, 2-7 (1983); Goodwin, supra note 2,at 3.
But see Bennett M. Rich, Revision By Constitutional Commission, in W. BROOKE GRAVES, ed.,
MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 86 (1960) (criticizing use of constitutional
commissions which report to the legislature).
36. Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS: THE
JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 57, 84 (1982) ("The mounting popularity of constitutional commissions
is attributable mainly to their general acceptibilty to state legislators who prefer to rely on bodies
over whose proposals they have control.").
37. James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State ConstitutionalTradition, 22 RUTGERS
L. J. 819, 830-31 (1991). See also Colantuono, supra note 4, at 1482.
38. W. Brooke Graves, State ConstitutionalLaw: A Twenty-Five Year Summary, 8 VM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 9 (1966).
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a different kind of constitutional commission:
Public demand for change is essential before the cumbersome machinery of rdvision can be put in motion. Such a demand can be developed
only by means of a campaign of education, and this in turn, can be
effectively conducted only after a great deal of preparatory work has
been done.
The usual procedure is to establish a study commission which can
serve the two-fold purpose of providing factual information for the
campaign - information which can be used again later when and if the
campaign succeeds in bringing a constitutional convention into
existence. Such a commission can be appointed by the governor on his
own initiative, or as a result of legislative action, authorizing and
directing that such a commission be established. Or it can come about
under private initiative, and be privately financed. This procedure is
sometimes necessary when the legislature refuses or a least fails to
provide the necessary funds.3 9
This use of the constitutional commission, as an adjunct to the
constitutionalconvention rather than to the legislature, seems to answer
Dr. Henretta's criticism, and to aid rather than impede the exercise of
popular sovereignty.4°

II. NEW YORK EXPERIENCE
The experience of New York with constitutional commissions is
representative of that in other states.
In New York, since 1872,
constitutional commissions have, as Graves noted in a wider context,
been "used for a variety of reasons, and in many different ways.
Some were appointed by the governor; others were established by the
legislature. Some were created in anticipation of a vote on the mandato-

39. Id. at 3-4. See also ELMER E. CORNWELL, JR., JAY S. GOODMAN & WAYNE R. SWANSON,
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE POLITICS OF THE REVISION PROCESS IN SEVEN STATES
10-12 (1975).
40. A constitutional commission was recently used in Oklahoma to develop and recommend
initiative petitions seeking state constitutional change. In In re InitiativePetitionNo. 344, 797 P.2d
326 (Okla. 1990), and In re Initiative Petition No. 342, 797 P.2d 331 (Okla. 1990) the Oklahoma
Supreme Court struck from the ballot initiatives developed by the commission that would have
revised articles of the Oklahoma Constitution. The court based its decisions on the single-subject
rule. See Robert H. Henry, The Oklahoma ConstitutionalRevision Commission: A Call to Arms
or the Sounding of Retreat?, 17 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 177 (1992); Dennis W. Arrow, Representative Government and PopularDistrust: The Obstruction/FacilitationConundrum RegardingState
ConstitutionalAmendment by InitiativePetition, 17 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 3, 66-86 (1992).
41. Graves, supra note 38, at 9.
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ry convention question; others resulted from the need to prepare quickly
after the question passed. The 1915 and 1938 conventions - one that
produced a constitution rejected at the polls, the other that resulted in the
adoption of major revisions - produced bodies of research that
influenced state government's development for decades after.
A second New York commission was established in 1875 by
Governor Samuel J. Tilden. Only one of its proposals, on debt limits,
was recommended by the legislature and approved by the voters. But the
work of the 1872 and 1875 constitutional commissions helped lay "the
ground work for many of the reforms adopted at the 1894 conven' 42
tion.
An 1890 commission created by the legislature returned to it with
recommendations concerning the judiciary. These were laid aside when
the election of a governor and legislature of the same party broke a
political deadlock and resulted in the calling of a constitutional convention in 1894 that was authorized at the polls in 1887.43
The 1915 Constitutional Convention was authorized by a narrow
majority in a very low turnout special election on April 7, 1914, with
delegates to be elected at the general election in that same year.
Following this vote the legislature created a five-person commission "to
collect, compile and print information and data for the Constitutional
Convention of 1915."
This commission contracted with the Bureau
of Municipal Research in New York City for what proved to be the most
extensive set of studies of state government done to that date.
A commission considered the judiciary again in 1921. A number
of its proposals (adapted from the failed 1915 proposals) were recommended by the legislature and approved by the voters.45
After the people authorized a constitutional convention when the
mandatory question was asked in 1936, Governor Herbert Lehman
appointed a committee to prepare background materials for delegates.
Chaired by Charles Poletti, who later became Lieutenant Governor, the
New York State Constitutional Convention Committee produced a body
of work extraordinary for is depth, breadth and quality.
In 1956, in preparation for the 1957 vote on whether to hold a
constitutional convention, the legislature established a Temporary
Commission on the Constitutional Convention. This commission, chaired

42.

Galie, supra note 22, at 16.

43. Id. at 17.
44. Laws of 1914, Chapter 261.
45. Galie, supra note 22, at 23-24.
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by Nelson Rockefeller (who later became governor) held public hearings
and developed background material. It actually remained in existence
after the voters rejected the convention, under the name Special
Committee on the Revision and Simplification of the Constitution. It
published a number of state constitutional reports before going out of
existence in 1961.46 Some of these provided the basis for amendments
later proposed through the legislature and adopted by the people.
After the New York voters approved the call of a constitutional
convention in 1965, the legislature created a Temporary Commission on
the Constitutional Convention. Dr. Galie reports that this commission
was "plagued by partisan divisions," and had little impact on the
convention.47 No commission was appointed in preparation for the
mandatory convention question in 1977, which was defeated at the polls
by a substantial margin.
In May, 1993, Governor Mario Cuomo promulgated an executive
order establishing a Temporary Commission on Constitutional Revision
to make preparations for the 1997 referendum on whether to call a
constitutional convention.48
New York's most recent commission is different from all the others.
As its report notes:
Although New York has had many constitutional revision commissions
throughout its history, most were created either after a referendum vote
or after the Legislature voted to place a convention call on the ballot.
In contrast, this Commission was created four and a half years in
advance of the constitutionally required referendum vote. Unlike
preceding commissions, it was established not to serve potential
delegates, but to inform the people at large about the constitutional
change process and to advise the Governor and Legislature about how
best to prepare for the possibility that a convention might in fact be

46. Id. at 27-28.

47. Id. at 28-29. For a summary of this commission's recommendations, see Alternative
Methods ofSimplification, in JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, SUBNATIONAL POLITICS: READINGS IN STATE

AND LOCAL GOvERNMENT 71 (2d ed. 1970). The commission suggested the interesting idea of the
"two-part constitution," where fundamental provisions on rights and governmental structure would
be amendable only by the existing methods of state constitutional change, but other, less important
regulatory details could be changed by a statute enacted by two successive legislatures and two
gubernatorial approvals. Id. at 72-75.
48. Exec. Order No. 172, May 26, 1993, reprintedin EFFECnVE GOVERNMENT NoW, infra
note 49, at 143. Selected excerpts of the commission's reports are reprinted in Documents, 26
RUTGERS L. J. 1355 (1995).
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called.49

The 1993-95 Commission had issued several interim reports
concerning the processes of state constitutional revision, substantive
matters, and several crucial voting rights and apportionment matters
surrounding a constitutional convention.50 In its February, 1995 Final
Report the Commission identified four crucial areas (the state budget
process, state-local relations, education and public safety) that were in
need of reform, including the possibility of state constitutional change.
The Commission recommended the creation of "action panels," modeled
on the National Commission on Social Security Reform and the federal
base closing commission, which would address each of the four areas and
make recommendations that the governor and the legislature would
commit ahead of time to consider seriously. In the absence of serious
consideration, and some meaningful reform, the Commission would
recommend a positive vote on whether a constitutional convention should
be called in 1997."' This is a unique approach to the problem of state
constitutional revision in an atmosphere where many people are worried
about the outcome of an unlimited state constitutional convention.52
This is a new technique of using the periodic referendum on calling a
state constitutional convention to pressure the executive and legislature
to accomplish substantial reform prior to the referendum.
The current New York Temporary Commission on State Constitutional Revision has a long, varied history behind it. Whatever the
political context for its creation, the work of many of its predecessor
commissions has had considerable impact on government in the state,
either immediately or in the decades that followed their deliberations and
recommendations.
Ill.

UTAH'S PERMANENT COMMISSION

A Utah law adopted in 1969 created a permanent sixteen-member
Constitution Revision Study Commission with heavy representation from

49. EFFEcTIvE GOVERNMENT Now FOR THE NEW CENTURY: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 11 (Feb. 1995).
50. See TEMPORARY NEW YORK STATE COMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION: THE

DELEGATE SELECTION PROCESS (MARCH 1994); THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A
BRIEFING BOOK (1994).
51. EFFECrIVE GOVERNMENT Now, supra note '49, at 11-32.
52. The concerns about state constitutional conventions are perceptively treated in Thomas Gais
and Gerald Benjamin, Public Discontent and the Decline of Deliberation: A Dilemma in State
ConstitutionalReform, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1291 (1995).
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the legislature. Commission members serve six-year terms. Three are
appointed by the governor and three each by the speaker of the House
and the president of the Senate from their respective bodies, with a
requirement of bipartisanship. These nine then appoint an additional six.
The legislative research director serves ex-officio.5 3 The commission
selects its own chair.
The Utah commission is authorized by law both to undertake its
own initiatives and to consider recommendations from state leaders and
"responsible segments of the public." But it may not make proposals
directly to the people for constitutional change. Its duties are " . . to
make a comprehensive examination of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, and of the amendments thereto, and thereafter to make recommendations to the governor and the legislature as to specific proposed
constitutional amendments designed to carry out the commission's
recommendations for changes in the constitution.' 5 4 Three of the
Commission's revised articles were referred by the legislature to the
voters and approved in 1992."5
IV. FLORIDA'S CONSTITUTIONALLY BASED COMMISSION: THE NEWEST
ALTERNATIVE METHOD FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

In Florida, as earlier noted, the 1968 Constitution provided for an
automatic, periodic review of the state constitution at regular intervals.
Article XI, Section 2 provided that ten years after adoption of the
constitution, and every twenty years thereafter, an appointedconstitution
revision commission would be created. This commission was empoweredto submit its recommended amendments or revisions directly to the
which was, at the
electorate, a mechanism of state constitutional revision
56
time, unique to American constitutional history
After adoption of the 1968 Florida Constitution, the ten years set for
automatic review went by very quickly. The 1977-78 Florida Constitu-

53. Chapter 54, Section 63-1, Laws of Utah. This seems to be the adoption of W. Brooke
Graves' suggestion of "continuous revision" of state constitutions. See W. Brooke Graves, Current
Trends in State Constitutional Revision, 40 NEB. L. REV. 560, 565-58 (1961). A similar
recommendation has been made in Alaska. See Janice C. May, supra note 9, at 5-6.
54. Chapter 54, Section 63-3, Laws of Utah. For a discussion of the history of the
commission, and its impact on the state constitution, see REPORT OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION COMMISSION, 1994. See also REPORT OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSiON (1996).
55. May, supra note 9, at 5.
56.

TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 15-16

(1991); Steven J. Uhlfelder, The Machinery of Revision, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 575 (1978).
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tion Revision Commission proceeded to engage in a very open, farreaching examination of the state constitution, and proposals for its
change. Its proceedings were extraordinarily well documented."
The Commission ultimately made important and well considered
recommendations for change in the state constitution to Florida's
voters."
All of the recommendations, however, were rejected. 9
Albert Sturm opined that the defeat resulted from the review coming too
soon after the comprehensive 1968 revision, without a popular call for
change, and from the presence on the ballot of another, controversial
measure on casino gambling. 0
On the surface, defeat of the 1978 proposed revisions in Florida
seems to be a great state constitutional revision failure. Constitutional
Revision Commission Chairman Sandy D'Alemberte, together with
others, takes a longer view of the failed 1978 revisions:
The immediate contribution of the commission was less than
historic, for its sweeping proposals (including abolition of the cabinet)
were lost when presented on a ballot alongside a very unpopular
proposal for casino gambling, which was placed there through the
initiative process. Although the commission's work was rejected by the
voters, a great deal of the agenda for further amendment of the
constitution was shaped by the Constitution Revision Commission. As
Steve Uhlfelder, executive director of the commission, has observed, in
the years following the commission, the legislature proposed and the
voters approved proposals in substantially the same format as those
developed by the commission. These included amendments adding a
right of privacy to the Declaration of Rights (adopted 1980), extending
impeachment to county judges (1988), providing uniform rules for the
judicial nominating commissions (1984), extending the widows'
exemption to widowers (1988), allowing the legislature to classify
inventory for property tax purposes (1980), and providing various
changes in the bonding power (1980, 1984).61

57. L. Harold Levinson, InterpretingState Constitutions by Resort to the Record, 6 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 567 (1978).
58. See generally Symposium on the ProposedRevisionto the FloridaConstitution, 6 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 565 (1968); Alaine S. Williams, A Summary and Background Analysis of the Proposed
1978 ConstitutionalRevisions, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1115 (1978).
59. D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 56, at 15.
60. STOR , supra note 36, at 85.

61. D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 56, at 15. See also Steven J. Uhifelder and Robert A.
McNeely, The 1978 ConstitutionRevision Commission: Florida'sBlueprintfor Change, 18 NOVA
L. REV. 1489 (1994). A similar phenomenon was documented in Minnesota after the 1947-48
Constitutional Commission. See G. Theodore Mitau, Constitutional Change by Amendment:
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This commission method of revision has stirred controversy, but
Florida voters rejected a legislative proposal in 1980 to abolish the
periodic commissions.62 In fact, in 1988 the voters approved the same
mechanism for the Tax and Budget Reform Commission.63 That
commission, organized every ten years, recently exercised its powers to
propose, inter alia, a budget reform amendment that was adopted by the
electorate at the November, 1992 election, overruling a holding
restricting the governor's budget powers. 64 In this way, the unique
Florida commission mechanism has been applied to the specialized, and
often intractable, fiscal questions involved in state and local government.
On the other hand, the new, specialized commission has been criticized
as usurping the more general authority of the periodic, 20-year commissions, and as possibly even eliminating fiscal matters from the authority
of the general commission. Currently, preparations are under way for the

1997 Florida Constitution Revision Commission. 5
V.

CALIFORNIA'S CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION

In 1993 the California Legislature created, and funded, the
California Constitution Revision Commission. 6 The governor had

Recommendations of the Minnesota ConstitutionalCommission in Ten Years' Perspective,44 MINN.
L. REV. 461 (1959). Apparently Minnesota's commission was proposed as an alternative to a
constitutional convention. See Lloyd M. Short, ConstitutionalRevisionfor Minnesota, STATE GOV'T
97 (May 1950). See also, Fred L. Morrison, An Introductionto the Minnesota Constitution,20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 287, 298 (1994) (describing the Minnesota Constitutional Study Commission in
the early 1970's). Similar observations have been made about the 1962 Constitutional Commission
in Oregon. Goodwin, supranote 2, at 7, 10.
62. Id. at 15.
63. Fla. Const. Art. XI, Section 6. Id. at 15, See generally Donna Blanton, The Taxation and
Budget Reform Commission:Florida'sBest Hopefor the Future, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 437 (1991).
64. Chiles v. Children A,B,C,D,E & F, 569 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1991).
65. Stephen T. Maher, The Conferenceon the Florida Constitution, 48 FLA. B.J. 66, 67 (Dec.
1994):
The sooner people start thinking about this opportunity, the better the
process will work. Because people do not change their constitutions lightly, the
people of Florida must come to understand the revision commission process and
must be prepared to consider the kind of fundamental changes that may result from
the process, if constitutional revision is to succeed. That means that first, the nature
of the process itself must be made clear.
See also Thomas C. Marks, Jr. and Alfred A. Colby, Some Proposed Changes to the Florida
Constitution, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1519 (1994).
66. Chapter 1243, LAWS OF CALIFORNIA 1993; Andre Henderson, Selling a Constitution in
Sacramento, GOVERNING 30 (December 1995).
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vetoed several earlier attempts to create a commission.6 7 The twenty-

three member Commission is to operate until the end of 1996, and has
a broad mandate, with a focus on budgetary matters.68 The Commission has prepared preliminary recommendations, 69 is publishing a
newsletter,70 and is conducting public hearings and video conferences
around the state.7' It will be very interesting to many people interested
in state constitutions to see what the Commission recommends and what
action the Legislature takes on the recommendations.
VI.

INCREASING RELIANCE ON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

After Jamesdn's inclusion of the "novel device" of the constitutional

commission in his treatise on constitutional conventions, other scholars
also began to take notice. In 1910 Walter F. Dodd noted the early
(unsuccessful) use of commissions in New Jersey (1852 and 1854), as
well as the New York experience and that in a number of other states.72
Dodd, echoing a point made by Jameson in his treatise, noted:
By seeking advice the legislature confesses its incompetency to act, and

67. May, supra note 9, at 6.
68. Id. See also Janice C. May, State Constitutions and ConstitutionalRevision, 1992-93, 30
THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2, 6 (1994)
69. See CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, CCRC NEWS 2-5 (Sept. 1995).

The Commission will soon publish a preliminary report. Among the Commission's preliminary
recommendations were eliminating a number of statewide elected executive officers, a unicameral
legislature with shorter sessions, authorization for privatization of public services, modification of
the initiative process, a constitutionally-mandated balanced, two-year budget, reform of public school
governance and financing, revision of the state-local governmental relationship, limitations on state
mandates to local government, and strengthening local home rule. Id. These are extremely
important recommendations, of national importance.
At its February, 1996 meetings, the Commission adopted all of its preliminary recommendations, except the unicameral legislatureproposal, which it rejected. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
REVISION COMMISSION, CCRC NEWS 2-5 (Mar. 1966).
70. See CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, infra note 103.

71. Id.
In 1993, a year prior to establishment of the California Constitution Revision
Commission "a group of public policy scholars in California universities formed an informal group
to investigate the relationship between the structure of the state constitution and the performance of
state and local government." CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE
GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE I (Bruce E. Cain and Roger G. Noll, eds., 1995).

This group's "objective has been to determine whether research in economics, law, and political
science could provide useful insights about revising the constitution that would have some chance
of winning widespread public support." Id. This volume is very interesting, with a wide range of
excellent contributions. It should have interest far beyond just California.
72. WALTER F. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 262-65
(1910, 1970 Da Capo Reprint).
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advice is useless in such a case because the legislature has discretion
to accept it wholly or in part, or to reject it. Stated in this way Judge
Jameson's objection seems hardly to require an answer. The constitu-

tional commission is useful under proper limitations as an adviser of
the legislative bodies...'

In 1915 James Q. Dealey also discussed state constitutional
commissions. "New England has been rather partial to the use of
constitutional commissions instead of conventions, and three states have
made experiments of this sort."'74 He briefly described the Maine
(1875), Rhode Island (1897) and Vermont (1908) experiences with
commissions.

5

Extensive consideration of the roles of commissions in the processes
of state constitutional revision, both as to quantity and quality, did not
come until the work of Bennett Rich 7 6 and Albert Sturm. 7 7 Others
have recognized the contributions of these two scholars to our understanding of state constitutional commissions. 7' For example, W. Brooke
Graves observed in 1966:

73. Id. at 265. For Jameson's similar criticism, see supra note 3, at 574.
74. JAMES Q. DEALEY, GRoWTH OF AMERICAN STATE CONsTITUTIONs 249 (1915, 1972 Da
Capo Reprint).
75. Id. at 249-50. See also id. at 101-02 (describing the Rhode Island experience). On the
1875 Maine Constitutional Commission, see MARSHALL J. TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 7-8 (1992).
It is unlikely that Dealey would have approved of the use of constitutional
commissions. James Henretta noted:
Both a work of academic scholarship and a progressive political
tract, Dealey's book celebrated the newly enhanced power of the
electorate to exercise its legal sovereignty "through the constitutional initiative and referendum" as well as through the constitutional
convention, "the great agency through which democracy finds
expression."
Henretta, supra note 37, at 829. Dealey did characterize the report of the 1897 Rhode Island
commission as "conservative to the last degree." Id. at 102, and the New England Commissions as
"strongly conservative." Id. at 250.
76. Bennett M. Rich, Convention or Commission? NAT'L MUNIC. REV. 133 (Mar. 1948);
Revision By Commission, NAT'L MUNIC. REV. 201 (Apr. 195 1). An updated version is cited in note
35, supra.
77. Albert L. Sturm and James B. Craig, Jr., State ConstitutionalCommissions: Fifteen Years
ofIncreasing Use, 39 STATE GOV'T. 56 (1966); Albert Sturm, supra note 36; ALBERT L. STURM,
THIRTY YEARS OF STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING: 1938-1968 21, 33-49, 138-155 (1970); Albert
L. Sturm, The ProcedureofState ConstitutionalChange- With SpecialEmphasis on the South and
Florida,5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 569, 586-88 (1977).
78. See, e.g., Graves, supra note 38, at 10; see also Nunn, supra note 2 at 317 (recognizing
Sturm's work).
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Although many advantages are claimed for the commission
device, it also has important disadvantages. Its advantages are reputed
to be that, being a small and prestigious body with a specific and
important task to perform in a limited time, it can attract the most able
men. It is far less costly than a convention. Most important of all, in
the eyes of many it can be used as a substitute for a convention.
Professors Rich and Sturm are among the most careful students of the
commission device. The former notes that few of these bodies measure
up to expectations, that the members are subject to the same prejudices
and political pressures as are the members of a legislature or a convention, and that they have "one inherent and fatal weakness in that their
every act is measured in terms of what they believe the legislature will
accept." The fact that they must report to the legislature may in itself
constitute an almost insurmountable barrier to thoroughgoing revision.79

Janice May has carried on the work started by Albert Sturm." °
In 1966 Sturm and James B. Craig, Jr. noted the increase in the use
of constitutional commissions,"' observed earlier by Rich.
They
reported the creation of thirty-eight commissions between 1950 and 1965,
with a sharp upturn between 1960 to 1965.2 They concluded:
The crux of the matter is ultimate legislative control. Legislative
bodies are jealous of their constitutional amendment and revision
prerogative. When they are presented with an alternative that enables
them to preserve this prerogative, in contrast with one, such as the
constitutional convention, over which their powers are far more limited,
the choice is obvious to most lawmakers. Recent experience points to
the continued use of constitutional commissions as staff arms of
legislative assemblies in general constitutional reform efforts. Only in
states where general public interest is relatively high, and where there
is heavy pressure from powerful interest groups-conditions that
commonly result only from some major emergency-is the theoretically

79. Id. For similar pro and con arguments, see Sturm, supra note 1, at 587-88; David J. Mays,
Some Thoughts on Revision ofthe Virginia Constitution,54 VA. L. REV. 974, 974-75 (1968); Ralph
C. Barnhart, A New Constitutionfor Arkansas? 17 ARK. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1962-63); Ernest R.
Bartley,Methods of ConstitutionalChange, in W. BROOKE GRAvEs, supra note 35, at 21, 25, 31-32;
John P. Wheeler, Jr., Changing the Fundamental Law, in SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION 49, 57-58 (John P. Wheeler, Jr., ed., 1961).
80. See, e.g., Janice C. May, State Constitutions and ConstitutionalRevision: 1988-89 and
the 1980s, 28 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 19, 23-25 (1990).
81. Albert L. Sturm and James B. Craig, Jr., State ConstitutionalCommissions: Fifteen Years
of Increasing Use, 39 STATE GOV'T 56 (1966).
82. Id. at 57-58.
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more democratic method of the constitutional convention likely to be
chosen for general revision or the writing of a new constitution. 3
In 1970 Sturm published the most definitive study of state
constitutional commissions to date, for the National Municipal League.
is Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making: 1938-1968 included
major consideration of commissions and extended his research back to
1938.8 4 He reported the creation of sixty-two constitutional commissions in thirty-five states between 1939 and 1968,85 included detailed
information on all of them, 6 and noted the "increasing popularity of
this device., 87 Twenty-two commissions had been formed in the four
years since his earlier data (1965-1968)."8
Then, in 1982, Sturm, together with Janice May, published data on
state constitutional commissions reaching back to 1930.89
They
reported that during the decade of the 1970s "constitutional commissions
wrote the initial drafts of all revised constitutions proposed to state
electorates by legislatures." 9 Although noting that the increased use of
commissions "has been one of the significant developments in the
procedure of state constitutional revision during the past 30 years .... ..
they also noted that in 1980-81 "fewer state constitutional commissions
or committees operated than in any biennium of the 1970s."9'
In 1990 Janice May reported that during the decade of the 1980s
there were only nine commissions created. 92 But for the 1992-93
period, she reported that commissions operated in four states and one was
authorized by statute in another state.93

83. Id. at 63.
84. ALBERT L. STUiRM, THIRTY YEARS OF STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING: 1938-1968 (1970).

85. Id. at 34.
86. Id. at 35-36; 138-55.
87. Id. at 37.
88. Id.
89. Albert L. Sturm and Janice C. May, State Constitutionsand ConstitutionalRevision: 198081 and the Past 50 Years, 24 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 115 (1982). W. Brooke Graves provided
an exhaustive, albeit now somewhat dated, bibliography on state constitutional revision, including
many references on state constitutional commissions, in Selected Bibliography,in GRAVES, supra
note 35, at 283.
90. Id. 124.

91. Id.
92. May, supra note 80, at 23. See also Gais and Benjamin, supra note 52, at 1303.
93. May, supra note 9, at 5.
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JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Because of the extratextual nature of constitutional commissions, it
is not surprising that their use in the process of state constitutional
change has been challenged in the courts. These challenges, however,
have generally failed under circumstances where commissions were
utilized in conjunction with constitutionally established methods of
changing the constitution. Georgia,94 Kentucky,9" Idaho," and Virginia97 have upheld the practice. Alabama,9 8 however, refused to
permit it in a case raising other related problems, disagreeing directly
with Georgia and Kentucky. Arkansas struck down an attempt by the
legislature to authorize a limited, appointed constitutional "convention."99 This general, albeit not unanimous, judicial endorsement of the
commission method, used in conjunction with the established, formal
mechanisms of state constitutional change will likely contribute to its
increasing use.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Constitutional commissions have made substantial contributions
around the country. Commissions have operated to set the agenda for
state constitutional revision both in the short run, in the legislative
session to which they report, but also sometimes for years to come. The
94. Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E.2d 322, 327-330 (Ga. 1946).
95. Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966). The decision in Gatewood was
criticized in Comment, 81 HARv.L. REv. 693, 695 (1968) on the grounds that it "has the effect of
significantly increasing the legislature's power to initiate and control the process of constitutional
revision. In fact, the legislature alone decided to have a new constitution drafted." The people of
Kentucky had rejected a convention call in 1960. Id.at 693. For a detailed analysis of the processes
in Kentucky leading to the Gatewood decision, see Paul Oberst and J.Kenderick Wells Ill,
Constitutional Reform in Kentucky - The 1966 Proposal,55 KY. L. J. 50 (1966).
96. Smith v. Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d I1(Idaho 1970). See generally, DONALD CROWLEY AND
FLORENCE HEFERON, THE IDAHO STATE CONSTTUTION:

A REFERENCE GUIDE 18-20 (1994)

(describing the commission, the litigation, and the defeat of the commission's recommendations at
the polls). The commission had recommended that the commission method be written into the Idaho
Constitution. See Cenarrusa,475 P.2d at 15.
97. Staples v. Gilmer, 33 S.E.2d 49, 56 (Va. 1945) (dictum). White, supra note 35, at 1148,
n.63.
98. State v. Manley, 441 So.2d 864, 876-77 (Ala. 1983).
99. Pryor v. Lowe, 523 S.W. 2d 199 (Ark. 1975). In 1995 the Arkansas Governor appointed
the Governor's Task Force for a New Constitution to prepare for a December vote on whether to
call a constitutional convention. Henderson, supra note 66, 30-31. In December, 1995 the Arkansas
voters turned down the call for a constitutional convention. See also Priest v. Polk, 912 S.W. 2d
902 (Ark. 1995) (legislation authorizing vote on constitutional convention constitutional).
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most influential political figures in the state have often served on state
constitutional commissions.
Their rate of use seems to have overtaken that of the state constitutional convention, but also to be linked to the rate of state constitutional
revision generally. Constitutional commissions, like constitutional
conventions (although somewhat less directly), operate within, and as
part of, the ongoing political processes of the states. 00 The recent
experience in Florida demonstrates that they may also provide a fourth
means to propose constitutional change directly to the people, in addition
to the convention, the legislative route, or (where it exists) the initiative
process. But, as Bennett M. Rich observed over thirty years ago, "the
commission device is no substitute for a convention. No amount of
wishing can make it so.""'
Although there is a certain amount of myth to the notion of
constitutional conventions,'0 2 they remain the foremost outlet for
"activist popular sovereignty."'0 3 Serving as an adjunct to a conven-

100. ELMER E. CORNWELL, JR., et. al., supra note 39, at 33-38, 192. For an excellent new
analysis of the political forces in state constitutional revision, see CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS INTHE
STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND HISTORICAL PATTERNS (G. Alan Tarr, ed., 1996).

101. Rich, supra note 35, at 99.
102. Harvey Walker, Myth and Reality in State ConstitutionalChange, in GRAVES, supra note
35 at 3, 15:
Mythologically, it is the personification of the sovereign people
assembled for the discharge of the solemn duty of framing their
fundamental law. It is supposed to be above politics and to have no
peers among governmental agencies. Yet, experience has shown
that the convention rarely rises above the legislature in the quality
and experience of its membership and that pressure groups and
political parties have significant influence upon its deliberations.
The cost of convening and holding a constitutional convention has
become practically prohibitive.
Many states in recent years have turned from conventions
to constitutional commissions that consist of experts who report to
the governor and legislature and whose handiwork is submitted for
popular vote, if approved by these political organs of the government. The saving in time and expense and the gain in the quality
of the work done should commend this new American institutional
device to constitution-framers as a replacement for the constitutional
convention. (Footnote omitted.)
But see generally, ELMER E. CORNWELL, JR., et. al., supra note 39.
103. Henretta, supra note 37. Janice May has observed, however, that commissions can act to
increase citizen input into the revision process through public hearings and even teleconferencing,
recently used by a legislative task force in Alaska. May, supra note 9, at 5. Teleconferencing is
also being used by the current California Constitution Revision Commission. CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, CCRC NEWS 1, 3 (Oct. 1995).
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tion, however, complementing its exercise of popular sovereignty, rather
than just a substitute for it, the commission can be a very important
positive component of state constitutional change. Further, as concerns
about the uncertain outcomes of constitutional conventions continue to
multiply, together with the dangers of the undeliberative initiative
process,"° the commission mechanism may be the only realistic
alternative for needed, and reasoned, state constitutional change. These
commissions may not fit Jefferson's vision of the process by which each
generation would give voice to its preferences, but they may be all we
have. State constitutions, by the political theory of Jefferson and others,
by their design, and by necessity, need mechanisms of change. As
Kermit Hall observed:
Most state constitutions have also been remarkably pliable, a
quality essential to their function of filling the vacant spaces of the
federal document ....
There have been 239 separate constitutional
conventions, and since the beginning of the republic there has never
been a three-year period in which at least one state constitutional
convention or, more recently a constitutionalrevision commission has
not met.'
j

Many important questions remain. What factors contributed to the
rise of the use of state constitutional commissions? One obvious
motivation was the legislative desire to maintain control over the agenda
of state constitutional change, although legislatures have not always
succeeded in achieving this goal. Prominently within this larger
motivation was the desire to avoid convention-mandated reapportionment,
a development that, when finally ordered by the United States Supreme
Court, opened the way for the explosion in state constitutional revision

104. Gais and Benjamin, supra note 52.
105. Kermit L. Hall, Mostly Anchor and Little Sail: The Evolution of American State
Constitutions, in PAUL FINKELMAN AND STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB. EDS., TOWVARD A USABLE PAST:
LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 388, 394 (1991) (emphasis added).
For treatments of the roles of constitutional commissions in specific state contexts,
see MELVIN B. HILL, THE GEORGIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 13-20 (1994);
WILLIAM H. STEwART, THE ALABAMA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 16-17 (1994);
FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE KANSAS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 24-34 (1992);
WILLIAM C. HILL, THE VERMONT STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 21 (1992); ROBERT
D. MIEWALD AND PETER J. LONGO, THE NEBRASKA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
20 (1993); JOHN W. WINKLE, THE MISSISSIPPI STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 16-17
(1993); TINKLE, supra note 75, at 10-13; JOSEPH R. GRODIN, CALVIN R. MASSEY AND RICHARD B.
CUNNINGHAM, THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 18-21 (1993); 1 A.E.
DICK HoWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION 20-23 (1974). See also materials
cited in supra note 2.
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in the 1960s and 1970s.106 Another motivation may have been an
attempt to avoid the abuses of the dominant political parties.
Constitutional commissions were likely one of the manifestations of
the broader Progressive, and later "managerial," views of government.'0 7 Reliance on scientific expertise and concerns for efficiency,
as opposed to the prior party politics and citizen (voter) involvement,
lead to a broad adoption of the commission mechanism throughout the
federal,'0" state and local governments. The use of state constitutional
commissions thus fits nicely into this larger political and societal
development. Possibly, though, now they have developed a momentum
of their own.
How effective have commissions actually been in attracting
expertise and bringing it to bear on state constitutional issues? Do the
appointees actually possess better qualifications than delegates elected to
constitutional conventions? Is one type of commission more successful
than others? How do we measure the success of state constitutional
commissions, or conventions, for that matter? Are commissions utilized
more in states without the constitutional initiative, or more for amendments rather than wholesale revisions?
These are all fair, important, and to a great extent, unexplored
questions about the use of state constitutional commissions. Many of
these questions were asked by colleagues reviewing drafts of this article.
A further exploration of these and related questions, however, is beyond
the scope of this preliminary article. Such questions do underscore the
need for further study (including comparative investigation), 9 analysis

106. Alan Tarr reminded me of this point. See also, Sturm, supra note 36, at 72-73.
107. I am indebted to John Kincaid for the suggestions forming the basis of this paragraph. Cf.,
Hall, supra note 105, at 406-07.
108. See James A. Stever, The Growth and Decline of Executive-Centered Intergovernmental
Management, 23 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 71, 74 (Winter, 1993) ("From 1936 to
1973, two Democratic and two Republican presidents sponsored six presidential commissions
dedicated to reorganization of the EOP [Executive Office of the President].")
109. Constitutional commissions have been used regularly around the world, both for

recommendations on national and subnational, or state, constitutions. Professor Christian Starck of
the University of G6ttingen, Germany, himself a consultant to the commission that recommended
the new 1994 Land (state) constitution for Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania to the Land Assembly,

has recently written about the process there and in other former East German Ldnder which have
adopted new state constitutions. See CHRISTIAN STARCK, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE NEW
GERMAN LANDER AND THEIR ORIGINS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Konrad Adenaur Foundation
Occasional Papers, June 1995). He made the following observation about the commission:
A commission differs from a committee, which is a suborgan of the Land
assembly. The constitutional commission of Mecklenburg-Westem
Pomerania was similar to a Royal commission in the UK. The essential
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and understanding of this much ignored, but increasingly important
mechanism of state constitutional change.

reason for establishing such a commission was that the people's
movement and other groups, active in expelling the communist party
dictatorship, failed to get seats in the Assembly, but deserved representation in the constitutional commission. In fact, they got 3 seats in the
commission, one for the people's movement, one for the Greens and one
for a representative of a former regional constitution drafting commission, which had produced a draft of a Land constitution in a first version
and later in a revised one...
The deliberations of the constitutional commission had begun in
January 1991 with broad declarations by members about their ideas on
how to construct a Land constitution. Then hearings of important social,
political and economic associations had taken place. The associations
commented particularly on the draft of the prior regional commission.
This draft did not seem suitable to the majority of the constitutional
commission as a basis for the deliberations. On demand of the president
of the Land Assembly Professor von Mutius and the author were charged
with preparing a draft of the organisational part of the constitution as
basis for the discussion in the commission. We shared in preparing the
text, coordinated and presented it to the commission. Our draft had been
oriented towards the new Constitution of the Land Schleswig-Holstein
and the Constitution of Lower Saxony.
Id. at 11.

